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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)G). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
NEVADA REVISED STATUTE 408.363: 
Claims against contractor's bond; action against surety. 
1. Any person who has furnished labor, materials, provisions, 
implements, machinery, means of transportation or supplies used or 
consumed by such contractor or his or its subcontractors in or about the 
performance of the work contracted to be done, and whose claim therefor 
has not been paid by such contractor or subcontractors, and who desires to 
be protected under the bond, shall file with the Department a claim in 
triplicate within 30 days from the date of final acceptance of the contract as 
provided in NRS 408.387, and such claim shall be executed and verified 
before a notary public and contain a statement that the same has not been 
paid. One copy shall be filed in the office of the Department and the 
remaining copies shall be forwarded to the contractor and surety. 
2. Any such person so filing a claim may at any time within 6 months 
thereafter commence an action against the surety or sureties on the bond for 
the recovery of the amount of the claim and the filing of such claim shall 
not constitute a claim against the Department. Failure to commence such 
action upon the bond and the sureties within 6 months after date of the 
Department's final acceptance will bar any right of action against such 
surety or sureties. 
NEVADA REVISED STATUTE 104.2207 (identical to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-
207, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207): 
Additional terms in acceptance or confirmation. 
1. A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written 
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those 
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on 
assent to the additional or different terms. 
2. The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to 
the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract 
unless: 
(a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(b) They materially alter it; or 
(c) Notification of objection to them has already been given or is 
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
3. Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is 
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not 
otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract 
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any 
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this chapter 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Crown Asphalt Products Company ("CAPCO"), filed a Complaint 
(R. 1-12) seeking to recover contract damages arising from its delivery of asphalt oil to 
defendant / petitioner, Frehner Construction Company, Inc. ("Frehner"), for its use at a 
highway construction project in Clark County, Nevada. In addition to its contract claims, 
CAPCO included a claim for unjust enrichment. As a remedy, CAPCO sought monetary 
damages against both Frehner and its surety, Safeco Insurance Company of America 
("Safeco"). (CAPCO sometimes refers to Frehner and Safeco collectively as 
"Petitioners".) 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
COURT 
Rather than answering CAPCO's Complaint, Frehner and Safeco filed a Motion to 
Dismiss for Improper Venue (R. 21-23), along with a supporting memorandum and 
affidavits (R. 24-54). CAPCO in turn filed a memorandum in opposition (R. 66-80), 
along with an affidavit of one if its attorneys (R. 55-65). Frehner and Safeco then filed a 
reply memorandum (R. 85-90) and another affidavit (R. 81-84). Finally, CAPCO then 
filed additional affidavits (R. 97-101 and 102-106) contradicting statements in the 
affidavits (R. 36-39 and 81-84) that Frehner and Safeco had previously submitted. After 
oral argument the district court denied Frehner's and Safeco's Motion to change venue 
(R. 108-110). 
III. STATEMENTS OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED 
This appeal presents both factual and legal questions. Petitioners' central legal 
requires this Court to decide as a matter of law which of two Nevada statutes governs the 
venue issue in this dispute. Frehner and Safeco argue that the more general of the two 
applies and required CAPCO to bring its action in Clark County, Nevada. CAPCO, on 
the other hand, shows in Point I, infra, that the more specific statute permitted CAPCO's 
chosen Utah venue. This legal issue is separate and distinct from any of the unresolved 
factual disputes involved in Petitioners' arguments that CAPCO orally agreed to a 
Nevada venue, and CAPCO's arguments that Frehner agreed to a Utah venue. 
The record shows that CAPCO disputes numerous facts that Frehner and Safeco 
recite at pages 2-4 of their initial brief. In particular, competent affidavit evidence shows: 
A. CAPCO's business dealings with Frehner have never been regulated by the 
terms and conditions of Frehner's purchase order contracts as Frehner claims. (R. 98, ^ 
4; 103, f 4) (This evidence contradicts claimed fact number 1 at page 2 of Petitioners' 
initial brief.) 
B. For various reasons CAPCO had developed a standard form Asphalt Sales 
Contract (the Contract") which provided a Salt Lake City venue for any legal dispute that 
arose between CAPCO and its customers. (R. 11-12; 103, f 6) 
C. In January 2002, CAPCO submitted a bid dated January 24, 2002, to 
Frehner for asphalt oil for Frehner's use in the road construction that is the subject of this 
dispute. That bid specifically stated that it was subject to the terms and conditions of 
CAPCO's Asphalt Sales Contract. (R. 41, Condition 4) Frehner later told CAPCO that 
CAPCO was the successful bidder, and that Frehner was accepting CAPCO's bid. 
Frehner did not condition its acceptance of CAPCO's bid on CAPCO's acceptance of 
Frehner's terms and conditions. (R. 98, f^ 5; 103-104, ^ 7) (This evidence contradicts 
claimed fact number 6 at page 3 of Petitioners' initial brief.) 
D. On February 1, 2002, CAPCO submitted its Asphalt Sales Contract (R. 11) 
to Frehner, containing a price of $191.00 per short ton of PG 76-22 asphalt oil. That 
Asphalt Sales Contract provides, in pertinent part: "The proper venue for any legal 
dispute hereunder shall be the state district court or federal court in Salt Lake City, Utah." 
(R. 12, f 12) (emphasis added) 
E. In response to CAPCO's February 1, 2002 offer, On March 8, 2002, 
Frehner issued its Bulk Purchase Order (R. 47) for PG 76-22 asphalt oil at a price of 
$191.00 per ton. Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order provides, in pertinent part: "The parties 
to this Purchase Order submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Nevada and 
expressly waive any objection to jurisdiction and venue in such Courts." (R. 48, ^ 20) 
(emphasis added) 
F. Although Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order contains a line for CAPCO's 
written acceptance of the Bulk Purchase Order's terms, CAPCO did not sign it. (R. 47) 
G. Frehner has never told CAPCO that any purchase from CAPCO "would be 
under the terms of Frehner's standard purchase order agreement, or not at all." To the 
contrary, Frehner has continued to purchase CAPCO product even after both CAPCO's 
president, Jay Mealey ("Mealey"), and its Vice-President, Scott Beall ("Beall"), told 
Frehner's President, Michael C. Pack ("Pack"), in no uncertain terms that CAPCO would 
not be bound by Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order terms and conditions. (R. 99, ^ f 8; 104, f 
10) (This evidence contradicts claimed fact number 7 at page 3 of Petitioners' initial 
brief.) 
H. CAPCO never agreed that it would sell product to Frehner under Frehner's 
Bulk Purchase Order for the Nevada highway project out of which this litigation arises. 
(R. 99, f 9; 100, 1 16; 104, f 11; 105, f 16) (This evidence contradicts claimed fact 
number 8 at page 3 of Petitioners' initial brief.) 
I. Mealey repeatedly told Pack unequivocally that CAPCO would not be 
bound by the terms of Frehner's Bulk Purchase Orders. (R. 104-105, ^ 12) (This 
evidence contradicts claimed fact number 7 at page 3 of Petitioners' initial brief.) 
J. Pack never told Beall that if CAPCO wanted to furnish product to Frehner, 
it would have to do so under Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order. (R. 99, Ifs 10-11) (This 
evidence contradicts claimed fact no. 12 at page 4 of Petitioners' initial brief.) 
K. The course of dealing between CAPCO and Frehner has followed neither 
CAPCO's Contract nor Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order. (R. 100, fs 14-15; 105, fs 14-
15) (This evidence contradicts claimed fact numbers 13 and 14 at page 4 of Petitioners' 
initial brief.) 
L. In a March 22, 2002 letter, the contracting agency, the Nevada Department 
of Transportation, wrote to CAPCO: "If, upon completion and acceptance of the project 
you find that monies are due your organization, you should file a claim as provided by 
NRS 408.363, a copy of which is attached. The remedy provided in NRS 408.363 may 
be initiated within 30 days of the final acceptance of the project and you will be notified 
of acceptance of this project." (R. 64) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Frehner first argues that a Nevada bond payment statute applicable to public works 
generally required CAPCO to file its action in Clark County, Nevada. The contract 
between CAPCO and Frehner, however, involved highway construction. The Nevada 
bond payment statute applicable to highway construction (rather than public works 
generally) does not require CAPCO to sue Frehner in either Clark County or anywhere 
else in Nevada. Because it is the more specific of the two statutes, the highway-
construction venue statute (Nevada Revised Statute 408.363) controls over the more 
general public works venue statute. The Nevada Department of Transportation wrote 
CAPCO early in the project telling it to file its claims under Nevada Revised Statute 
408.363. 
Frehner next makes the combined argument that (A) CAPCO orally agreed to 
Frehner's Nevada venue provision, and (B) the Nevada Venue provision in its Bulk 
Purchase Order required a Nevada venue for this action. Even if it were this Court's role 
to address factual disputes, which it is not, disputed issues of material fact preclude the 
determination on appeal of which party's version of events is more persuasive. 
Furthermore, each of the various competing interpretations of the Uniform Commercial 
Code section applicable to this dispute would ignore Frehner's Nevada venue provision. 
If the parties' contract contains any venue provision, it necessarily is CAPCO's Utah 
venue provision. 
Third, Frehner asks this Court to reverse the district court based on a personal 
jurisdiction issue that Frehner did not raise in the district court. After going outside the 
record in this case and improperly attaching pleadings from that dispute - which involved 
different parties and different arguments - Frehner asks this Court to adopt the reasoning 
of the trial judge in that unrelated dispute even though Petitioners' district court pleadings 
were silent on the subject of personal jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioners' initial brief contains three arguments. They first argue that a Nevada 
statute required CAPCO to bring its action in Nevada. Next, Petitioners argue that the 
parties agreed to a Nevada venue. Finally, they suggest for the first time on appeal that 
the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. For the reasons that follow, this 
Court should reject each of Petitioners' arguments. 
I. PETITIONERS RELY ON THE WRONG NEVADA STATUTE; THE 
APPLICABLE NEVADA STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE CAPCO 
TO SUE FREHNER IN NEVADA 
Petitioners' own Statement of Facts establish that the material CAPCO supplied 
Frehner was "for the Boulder Highway project in Clark County, Nevada." See 
Petitioner's initial brief at 2, fs 2-3. 
There is a critical distinction in Nevada law between (1) the venue for bond claims 
involving Nevada public works projects generally, and (2) the venue for bond claims 
involving Nevada highway contracts. In making their venue argument, Petitioners ignore 
this distinction. Instead, they rely exclusively on the language of Nevada Revised Statute 
("NRS") 339.055, which requires payment bond claimants to file their claims "in the 
appropriate court of the political subdivision where the contract for which the bond was 
given was to be performed." 
NRS 339.055 appears in Chapter 339 of Nevada Revised Statutes, which is 
entitled "Contractors' Bonds on Public Works." Chapter 339 contains no reference to 
"highways" or "roads". 
Chapter 408 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, however, is entitled "Highways, 
Roads and Transportation Facilities". NRS 408.363 spells out the procedure a 
subcontractor such as CAPCO is to follow in pursuing a claim against a highway 
contractor's bond such as the one that Safeco issued in this case: 
Claims against contractor's bond; action against surety. 
1. Any person who has furnished labor, materials, provisions, 
implements, machinery, means of transportation or supplies used or 
consumed by such contractor or his or its subcontractors in or about the 
performance of the work contracted to be done, and whose claim therefor 
has not been paid by such contractor or subcontractors, and who desires to 
be protected under the bond, shall file with the Department a claim in 
triplicate within 30 days from the date of final acceptance of the contract as 
provided in NRS 408.387, and such claim shall be executed and verified 
before a notary public and contain a statement that the same has not been 
paid. One copy shall be filed in the office of the Department and the 
remaining copies shall be forwarded to the contractor and surety. 
2. Any such person so filing a claim may at any time within 6 
months thereafter commence an action against the surety or sureties on the 
bond for the recovery of the amount of the claim and the filing of such 
claim shall not constitute a claim against the Department. Failure to 
commence such action upon the bond and the sureties within 6 months after 
date of the Department's final acceptance will bar any right of action 
against such surety or sureties. 
NRS 408.363 therefore lacks any mandatory venue provision applicable to bond 
claims of a subcontractor on a highway or road construction project. The language 
Petitioners rely on in NRS 339.055 - "shall be brought in the appropriate court of the 
political subdivision where the contract for which the bond was given was to be 
performed" - is missing from NRS 408.363. 
Because CAPCO was a subcontractor on a highway construction project, a well-
recognized canon of statutory construction compels the conclusion that NRS 408.363, 
rather than NRS 339.055, provides the venue rule applicable to CAPCO's bond claim 
against Safeco.1 
Frehner correctly does not contend that any Nevada statute limits the venue of a claim 
against Frehner, as opposed to Safeco. 
This canon provides that when two statutory provisions conflict, the more specific 
provision will prevail over the more general provision. See, e.g., Williams v. Public Serv. 
Cornm'n, 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988); Gaines v. State of Nevada, 998 P.2d 166, 170 
(Nev.), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 856 (2000) ("It is also well recognized that specific statutes 
take precedence over general statutes.") 
In Williams, the plaintiff challenged the Utah Public Service Commission's 
adoption of a rule. There were two rulemaking statutes that arguably could have 
controlled the adoption process. One statute, the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, 
Utah Code Ann., §§ 63-46a-l to -15, provided for review of a rule by means of a 
declaratory judgment action in any district court. See Williams, 754 P.2d at 46. The 
other statute, Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15, required a party to request the Public Service 
Commission to hold a rehearing before seeking judicial relief. Id. at 47. 
After analyzing the two statutes, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that their 
review procedures were in conflict: "[T]itle 54, governing public utilities, and section 63-
46a-13, governing administrative rule making generally, contemplate different 
procedures for review." The Supreme Court resolved the conflict by holding that in cases 
of conflict between a statute establishing generally applicable procedures and another 
statute with specifically applicable procedures, the more specific statute controls: 
Sections 54-7-1 to -30 of the Public Utilities Act specifically provide for 
hearings, proceedings, and methods by which the PSC is to regulate and 
oversee public utilities. Title 54 does not govern any other administrative 
agency or serve any purpose beyond that related to the regulation and 
oversight of public utilities. Section 63-46a-13, as part of the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, however, is much more general in its 
application. It governs all administrative agencies operating in the state of 
Utah and is used in any type of rule-making session. Although it includes 
the PSCs rule-making proceedings, section 63-46a-13 is far more general 
in nature and is therefore superseded by the specific provisions contained in 
title 54. 
Id. at 48 (emphasis added). 
The analysis and result are identical in this case. Chapter 408 of the Nevada 
Revised Statutes specifically defines the procedures applicable to a bond claimant who 
provided work or materials on a highway project. By its express language, Chapter 408 
does not apply to any other category of bond claimants or serve any public purpose 
beyond that related to the regulation, oversight and construction of Nevada roads and 
highways. 
On the other hand, Chapter 339, which applies to contractors' bonds on all public 
works, is far more general in nature than Chapter 408. Accordingly, just as in Williams, 
Chapter 339 "is far more general in nature and is therefore superseded by the specific 
provisions contained in" Chapter 408. 
As far as CAPCO can determine, only the Tennessee Supreme Court has squarely 
addressed this issue in a reported decision. In Pan Am. Petroleum v. McQuary, 51 
S.W.2d 854, 855 (Tenn. 1932) that court wrote: 
We think a proper construction of the statutes is that the act of 1899 and the 
act of 1925 relate to contracts for public works generally. That the act of 
1917 and the act of 1929 relate to highway contracts only. In so far as the 
provisions of the acts of 1899 and 1925 on the one hand, and the provisions 
of the acts of 1917 and 1929 on the other are out of harmony, the provisions 
of the two acts last mentioned control the rights of all parties to highway 
contracts. (Emphasis added) 
The Nevada Department of Transportation ("NDOT") itself agrees with the 
foregoing analyses by the Utah, Nevada and Tennessee courts. In a March 22, 2002 letter 
to CAPCO, NDOT wrote: "If, upon completion and acceptance of the project you find 
that monies are due your organization, you should file a claim as provided by NRS 
408.363, a copy of which is attached. The remedy provided in NRS 408.363 may be 
initiated within 30 days of the final acceptance of the project and you will be notified of 
acceptance of this project." (R. 64) 
Thus, there is no doubt which statute the contracting agency itself applies to bond 
claims. It is NRS 408.363, the same statute that this Court should conclude applies to 
CAPCO's bond claim against Safeco. There is no legal basis for Petitioners' unsupported 
assertion that NRS 339.055 applies to CAPCO's claims under its highway construction 
subcontract. 
Petitioners have failed to identify any authority for their implicit argument that the 
terms of a more general statute control over the terms of a more specific statute. This 
Court should therefore conclude that the foregoing authorities are compelling, and that 
NRS 339.055 has nothing to do with the dispute between Petitioners and CAPCO. 
II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THIS COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT 
THE PARTIES CONTRACTED FOR A NEVADA VENUE 
In their discussion at page 6 of the standard of review, Petitioners include only the 
standard of review for questions of law. This is not, however, the standard of review for 
the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss for improper venue governed by Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). Rather, 
[i]n reviewing a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, we view the facts and "construe the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his 
favor." Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 
1991) (ruling on rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). 
The trial court's decision that venue is proper, despite a forum-selection 
clause to the contrary, will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 
Eads v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins., 785 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 1989); Personalized Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. Stotler & Co., 447 N.W.2d 
447, 451 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that court abuses its discretion in 
enforcing forum-selection clause where clause is "so unreasonable that its 
enforcement would be . . . against both logic and the facts on the record"). 
Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 810 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the proper standard of review is for this Court to construe the Complaint in 
CAPCO's favor, to afford to it all reasonable inferences from the facts set forth in the 
various affidavits, and to reverse the district court only if this Court is convinced that the 
district court abused its discretion.2 
Notwithstanding the deferential review this Court affords the district court's 
ruling, at page 8 of their initial brief Petitioners ask this Court to disregard all factual 
disputes and to accept as undisputed that Frehner's "Bulk Purchase Order was the 
document under which the parties were operating on the Boulder Highway Project." 
Unlike the situation with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court's 
consideration of matters outside the pleadings such as affidavits did not convert 
Petitioners' Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue into a motion for summary judgment. 
See, e.g., Coombs v. Juice Works Dev. Co., Inc., 2003 UT App. 388, ^  7, 81 P.3d 769. 
13 
This Court should properly refuse to do what Petitioners ask for two reasons. 
First, it is not this Court's role to resolve factual disputes. Second, the law nullifies the 
claimed contractual Nevada venue provision on which Petitioners rely.3 
A. This Court Does Not Resolve Disputed Factual Issues 
The parties vigorously dispute whether CAPCO contractually consented to a 
Nevada venue, or Frehner consented to a Utah venue. To the extent Petitioners ask this 
Court to resolve that factual dispute in the context of an interlocutory appeal of a purely 
legal ruling, their request is improper. See, e.g., 4 AM JUR 2d Appellate Review § 126 
(1995) ("questions of fact. . . may not be properly certified for appellate review."); 16 C. 
Wright, A. Miller and E. Cooper FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2d 
(1996) § 3930 at 427-28 ("There indeed is no reason to suppose that interlocutory appeals 
are to be certified for the purpose of inflicting upon courts of appeals an unaccustomed 
and ill-suited role as factfinders."); cf. Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1961) 
("whenever it appears likely that the matters in dispute can be finally disposed of in a trial 
. . . the desired objective is best served by refusing to entertain an interlocutory appeal 
and letting the case proceed to trial.") 
There are profound factual disputes that prevent any ruling on appeal that either 
CAPCO's Contract or Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order controls the venue in this case. 
3
 At pages 8-9 of their brief, Petitioners string-cite various judicial decisions that have 
enforced forum-selection clauses. There was no need for Petitioners to do this. CAPCO 
has never taken the position that such clauses are unenforceable. CAPCO merely has 
argued for the reasons it again repeats in this brief that there is no agreement requiring a 
Nevada venue for this dispute. 
However, CAPCO shows in the immediately following discussion that Frehner's 
purported Nevada venue provision is in any event ineffective to require CAPCO to 
litigate in Nevada. 
B. Frehner's Purported Nevada Venue Clause Is A Nullity 
In this dispute CAPCO first proposed its form. Five weeks later Frehner 
submitted its own form as a counteroffer. The forms are different on the issue of venue. 
At page 5 of their initial brief, Petitioners acknowledge that this creates a "battle 
of the form case . . ." Rather than confronting the "battle of the forms" issue they 
acknowledge, however, Petitioners immediately retreat into their argument regarding 
NRS 339.055 which CAPCO has already addressed above. 
Petitioners continue to skirt the "battle of the forms" issue when they ask this 
Court to find (or assume) that CAPCO agreed to abide by Frehner's venue provision 
despite the numerous contested issues of fact that preclude this Court from making such a 
finding. CAPCO has already addressed this issue in the immediately preceding portion 
of this brief. 
In fashioning their initial brief as they did, Petitioners sought to obscure the 
outcome of the "battle of the forms" in this case. Universally, that outcome is the 
disregard of Frehner's Nevada venue. CAPCO will now explain why this is so. 
CAPCO sold asphalt oil to Frehner. Until affixed to the highway itself, asphalt4 is 
4
 CAPCO has not been able to find a Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")decision 
addressing the applicability of the UCC to asphalt oil, rather than asphalt. Asphalt oil is 
one of several components of asphalt, however; and there is no principled reason why the 
UCC would apply to asphalt, but not to asphalt oil. 
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considered "goods" that are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 
("UCC"). See, e.g., TexPar Energy, Inc. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 45 F.3d 1111, 1113 
(7th Cir. 1995); Glenn Thurman, Inc. v. Moore Const, Inc., 942 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. 
Ct.App. 1997). 
Either Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 or NRS 104.2207 applies to the present 
dispute, where Frehner's form contract (R. 48) requires a Nevada venue, and CAPCO's 
form contract (R. 12) requires a Utah venue. It is immaterial which statute technically 
applies because both statutes are identical to UCC § 2-207: 
Additional terms in acceptance or confirmation. 
1. A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a 
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those 
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on 
assent to the additional or different terms. 
2. The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for 
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the 
contract unless: 
(a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(b) They materially alter it; or 
(c) Notification of objection to them has already been given or is 
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
3. Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a 
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of 
the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of 
the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the 
parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under 
any other provisions of this chapter (emphasis added). 
Neither Utah nor Nevada courts have construed this language in a reported 
decision. Appellate courts from numerous other jurisdiction, however, have analyzed this 
UCC section in depth. Inasmuch as the UCC is national in scope, Utah appellate courts 
rely on decisions from other jurisdictions to interpret the UCC. See, e.g., Power Sys. & 
Controls v. Keith's Elec. Const Co., 765 P.2d 5, 10 n.2 (Utah Ct. App 1988). 
Decisions from the three most recent State appellate courts to address UCC section 
2-207 show why CAPCO and Frehner did not agree to a Nevada venue under any 
interpretation of this controlling Uniform Commercial Code section. 
1. UNDER THE MAJORITY VIEW THERE IS NO 
CONTRACTUAL VENUE PROVISION 
Under the view adopted by the majority of the courts to address the issue, the 
contract between CAPCO and Frehner does not contain any venue provision because the 
conflicting requirements of Utah and Nevada cancel one another, and consequently are 
"knocked out" of the parties' contract. See, e.g., Flender Corp. v. Tippins Int'l, Inc., 830 
A.2d 1279, 1285-87, f^s 19-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Richardson v. Union Carbide Indus. 
Gases, Inc., 790 A.2d 962, 967-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); Superior Boiler 
Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc., 711 A.2d 628, 635 (R.I. 1998). Under this approach, 
the agreement between CAPCO and Frehner contains no contractual venue provision. 
2. UNDER THE TWO MINORITY VIEWS, CAPCO'S UTAH 
VENUE PROVISION CONTROLS VENUE AND 
REQUIRES LITIGATION TO PROCEED IN SALT LAKE 
COUNTY 
A smaller number of courts permit the terms of the offer to control. See, e.g., 
Flender, 830 A.2d at 1285, ^  18; Richardson, 790 A.2d at 533; Superior Boiler, 711 A.2d 
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at 635. In the present dispute it is undisputed that CAPCO is the offeror. It submitted its 
Asphalt Sales Contract to Frehner on February 1, 2002. In its capacity as the offeree, 
Frehner responded by proposing instead its Bulk Purchase Order on March 8, 2002. 
The third approach reaches the same result as the second, but only when the 
differences are material. In that case, the offeror's (here CAPCO's) term would control. 
See, e.g., Richardson, 790 A.2d at 533; Superior Boiler, 711 A.2d at 635. 
3. NO COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF UCC § 2-207 
RECOGNIZES A NEVADA VENUE FOR THIS DISPUTE 
Thus, Frehner's Nevada venue would not apply under any of the three 
interpretations that courts have made of UCC section 2-207. If Nevada should adopt the 
majority "knockout" view, the contract would contain no venue provision, leaving the 
venue decision to common- and statutory law principles. CAPCO shows in the 
immediately following section that Petitioners have never argued that a Utah venue 
offends these principles. If, on the other hand, a court follow one of the two minority 
interpretations of UCC section 2-207, the parties' contract would provide for a Utah 
venue because that is the forum designated in CAPCO's (the offeror's) document. 
Accordingly, under any standard of review applicable to the issues involving the 
parties' contract formation, and the interpretation of that contract, the district court did 
not err in finding that a Utah venue was appropriate to decide the issues that this litigation 
presents, including the disputed content of conversations the parties claim to have had 
about their respective venue provisions. 
III. PETITIONERS IMPROPERLY ATTACH PLEADINGS FROM 
ANOTHER CASE TO MAKE AN ARGUMENT THAT THEY 
NEVER MADE BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT; IT IS 
IRRELEVANT WHAT A SECOND DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
DECIDED IN ANOTHER CASE ON DIFFERENT FACTS AND 
WITH DIFFERENT PLEADINGS 
It is "axiomatic" that Utah Appellate courts do not permit a petitioning or 
appealing party to raise issues for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Franklin Fin. v. New 
Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983); Coombs v. Juice Works Dev. Co., 
Inc., 2003 UT App. 388, f^ 6 n.2, 81 P.3d 769. Petitioners apparently attempt to escape 
this rule by simply, but wrongly, asserting at page 11 of their initial brief that their 
present appeal involves "the same thing" that they argued before the district court. The 
record, however, shows that Petitioners' arguments are new, and not "the same thing" at 
all. 
Nothing could make the point more clearly than Petitioners' improper appending 
to their initial brief of three documents from another district court case between different 
parties appearing before a different district court judge, rather than citing to pages in the 
record. 
Petitioners' unauthorized attachment of these pleadings from another trial court 
case was improper because the record on appeal consists only of the original papers and 
exhibits filed in the district court that the district court certifies and transmits to the 
appellate court. See, e.g., Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, f^ 
33, 70 P.3d 904. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h) is the method by which a party 
to an appeal supplements the record on appeal, id., but a party cannot use Rule 11(h) to 
include new material into the record. See, e.g., Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 
P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Consequently, by attaching matters from outside the record, Petitioners have 
violated Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h). The Court should strike the three 
attachments to Petitioners5 initial brief. Once it has struck those three attachments, there 
is nothing left to Petitioners third point, and this Court has nothing remaining to consider. 
Should, however, this Court consider the attachments from the other dispute, it 
will quickly become apparent that the defendants in that second case frontally challenged 
Utah courts' personal jurisdiction over them. By contrast, Petitioners' memorandum 
before the district court in this case (R. 24-54) says nothing on the issue of personal 
jurisdiction. 
Therefore, when Petitioners say at page 10 that this second case involved "the 
exact issues" that were before the district court in this case, and at page 11 that the two 
different district court judges addressed "the same thing", Petitioners are involved in 
wishful thinking in the extreme. Until their initial brief on appeal, Petitioners have never 
so much as hinted that Utah courts lack personal jurisdiction over them. Of course, that 
is too late to seek a ruling that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction. See Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(h); Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 764 (Utah 1985). 
Not only, then, do Petitioners seek to take advantage of pleadings outside the 
record; they also seek to take advantage of a legal argument they did not make before the 
district court. Whatever merit the opinion from the second district court judge may or 
may not have on the subject of personal jurisdiction and due process, it has nothing to do 
with this case, which Petitioners defended exclusively under Rule 12(b)(3) (venue); not 
Rule 12(b)(2) (personal jurisdiction).5 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should AFFIRM in all respects the district 
court's ruling that venue is proper in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
DATED: July 27, 2004 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
fau/j. 
Jeffrey W. Shields/ 
Bruce Wycoff 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
In this point Petitioners also seem to be tacitly arguing that the opinion of the second 
district court judge in some unstated manner binds this Court on appeal. To the contrary, 
the law is clear that the prior opinion of an inferior court cannot bind a superior court at a 
later time. Cf, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 
886 P.2d 514, 525 n.14 (Utah 1994). 
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